A Priori Causal Laws by Bradley, D
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=sinq20
Download by: [University of Leeds] Date: 04 January 2017, At: 07:34
Inquiry
An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy
ISSN: 0020-174X (Print) 1502-3923 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/sinq20
A priori causal laws
Darren Bradley
To cite this article: Darren Bradley (2016): A priori causal laws, Inquiry, DOI:
10.1080/0020174X.2016.1175378
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2016.1175378
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 26 May 2016.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 536
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
 OPEN ACCESS
InquIry, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2016.1175378
A priori causal laws
Darren Bradley
Philosophy Department, Leeds university, Leeds, uK
ARTICLE HISTORY received 17 July 2015; Accepted 29 March 2016
KEYWORDS Laws of nature; cause; functionalism; fitness; natural selection; a priori
1. Introduction
Sober (2011) and Elgin and Sober (Forthcoming) defend the claim 
that there are a priori causal laws in biology – specifically, laws say-
ing that fitter traits will probably increase in frequency. Lange and 
Rosenberg (2011) take issue with this on Humean grounds, among 
others. I will argue that Sober and Elgin don’t go far enough – there 
are a priori causal laws in many sciences. Furthermore, I will argue 
that this thesis is compatible with a Humean metaphysics and an 
empiricist epistemology.
The starting point will be a discussion of how mental expla-
nations work according to David Lewis’s functionalism. Moving 
from functional terms, to functional properties, to functional laws, 
reveals that these functional laws have several strange features – 
including that they look a priori, necessary and trivial. I will argue 
that none of these features is problematic. But they do reveal that 
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there are significant differences between functional laws and fun-
damental laws.
Section 2 explains what functional laws are and Section 3 
explains the various ways in which they might be thought prob-
lematic. Section 4 explains how these apparent problems either dis-
appear upon scrutiny or should be embraced. Section 5 concludes.
2. Functional laws
My aim is to defend a position that applies to all functional terms, 
so it is useful to start in the area that is most closely associated with 
functionalism – philosophy of mind, and specifically with Lewis’s 
version of functionalism.
In ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’ Lewis raises ‘a 
familiar problem about mental explanations. How can my behav-
iour be explained by an explanans consisting of nothing but par-
ticular-fact premises about my present state of mind? Where are 
the covering laws?’ 257
Lewis doesn’t give an example, but he has in mind something 
like the following. My reaching for an umbrella can be explained by 
my present state of mind – my desire to stay dry (combined with 
my belief that the umbrella will keep me dry plus the usual ceteris 
paribus details, such as having no strong conflicting desires). The 
purported explanation, in simplified form, looks like this:
Explanans:  Desire to stay dry.
Explanandum:  Reaching for umbrella.
The problem is that this seems to be a good explanation even 
though there is nothing linking the explanans with the explanan-
dum. The explanans states one fact, and the explanandum states 
another – there is no link, such as a law of nature, connecting 
them. The problem is obvious if we accept the classical view that 
explanations require a law of nature linking the two sets of facts.1 
But even if we don’t demand a law of nature, there must be some 
connection between the two sets of facts.2
1Hempel and Oppenheim (1948).
2For example, Schaffer (ms) has a broad view of explanation, on which explanations can be 
causal, logical or metaphysical. In all three cases, explanation has a tripartite structure – a 
basis, a link and a result. In our example above, there is a basis (the desire), there is a result 
(reaching for an umbrella) but there is no link – there is nothing connecting the desire with 
the reaching for an umbrella.
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The connection falls out of Lewis’s functional account of the-
oretical terms. The term ‘desire’ is defined as referring to states 
that cause their objects (i.e. the objects of desire) under the right 
conditions (we’ll put the relevant beliefs and other ceteris paribus 
conditions in here under ‘right conditions’). For example, ‘a desire 
to keep dry’ refers to whatever state causes dry-keeping behavior 
under the right conditions:
[Functional definition] ‘The desire to stay dry’ = ‘the state that causes 
dry-keeping behaviour (under the right conditions)’.
This leads to the following principle:
[M] If something is the referent of ‘the desire to stay dry’ then it causes 
dry-keeping behaviour (under the right conditions.3)
We can now infer that:
[*] If something is a desire to keep dry then it causes dry-keeping 
behaviour (under the right conditions).
This inference from [M] to [*] requires only a move from the 
meta-language to the object language.
and [*] gives us a link from the explanans to the explanandum 
– from the desire to the behavior. Furthermore, we can see why 
this link did not need to be made explicit in the explanation above. 
The link is implicit in the term ‘desire’.
Our question is whether [*] a law. There are various worries here, 
some of which are the topic of this paper. But I want to set aside a 
couple of familiar objections which I will not be concerned with. 
For example, some argue that laws cannot contain ceteris paribus 
conditions like ‘under the right conditions’.4 Others argue that laws 
must refer to universals, and perhaps desires are not universals.5 
But these are not the issues at stake in the debate between Sober 
& Elgin and Lange & Rosenberg. The issues here are specific to laws 
involving functional terms. So let’s tentatively call [*] a law and see 
which problems emerge.
3notice this is the second time the ‘right conditions’ appears in M. It is implicit in ‘the desire to 
stay dry’ which is defined as ‘the state that causes dry-keeping behaviour (under the right 
conditions)’. Then the ‘right conditions’ appear explicitly at the end of M. This latter appear-
ance is needed to ensure that the antecedent causes the consequent e.g. where an agent 
desires to stay dry but doesn’t believe any actions would achieve this, the desire does not 
cause dry-keeping behaviour. Thanks to a referee for raising this.
4Davidson (1970).
5Armstrong (1983).
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3. Problems
Let’s have a closer look at the law we are invoking, [*], in a more 
general form, and leaving the ceteris paribus clause implicit:
[Des] The desire that p causes p.
In ordinary language, this law looks unproblematic. But we saw 
that according to functionalism, ‘the desire that p’ is analyzed as 
‘the state that causes p’:
[Functional definition generalized] ‘The desire that p’ = ‘the state that 
causes p’,
So the law, Des, can be more perspicuously stated as:
[Des’] The state that causes p causes p.
now the problem is obvious. Let’s separate five challenges to Des’ 
as a purported law of nature:
(1)   The law is a priori i.e. can be justifiably believed inde-
pendently of any empirical evidence. The idea that we 
might discover laws without making any investigation 
into the world is absurd.
(2)   The law is necessary. This conflicts with the Humean dic-
tum that there are no necessary connections between 
distinct existences.
(3)   The law is not explanatory. It is a triviality, and so cannot 
explain.
(4)   The law is not causally explanatory. Even granting that it 
is causal in some sense, the law does not cite the caus-
ally relevant properties.
(5)   The law overdetermines. The neural state that realizes 
the desire causes p. any further causes, such as the 
desire, would overdetermine the effect, and widespread 
overdetermination is implausible.
The same challenges apply to other laws stated using functional 
terms. Here are two other examples. If something is a mousetrap, 
then it causes the containment of mice; thus there is a law con-
necting mousetraps with mouse containments, and calling some-
thing ‘a mousetrap’ invokes this law. Similarly, if something is a 
currency, then it is used as a medium of exchange; thus there is a 
law connecting currency with exchanges, and calling something 
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‘currency’ invokes this law. This example from economics brings 
out the breadth of the problem – many higher-level sciences use 
functional terms.
Returning finally to the debate between Sober & Elgin and 
Lange & Rosenberg, function lies at the core of the concept of 
fitness, which plays a crucial role in most accounts of evolutionary 
biology. unfortunately there is a no uncontroversial definition of 
fitness. Rather than trying to adjudicate between them, I will work 
with one, as I think the issues I discuss will apply to any other con-
cept of fitness. Let’s say that trait a is fitter than trait B if and only if 
organisms with a are expected to have more offspring than organ-
isms with trait B.6 If we make various simplifying assumptions, such 
as the traits being heritable, plus ceteris paribus conditions, we 
arrive at the following law:
[P] If trait a is fitter than trait B in a population, then a will probably 
increase in frequency.7
Substituting in the functional definition of ‘fitter’, P can be more 
perspicuously stated as P’:
[P’] If organisms with a are expected to have more offspring than 
organisms with trait B, then a will probably increase in frequency.
and this seems to have all the same problems as [Des’]. Sober 
(2011) argues that P is an a priori causal law. Lange and Rosenberg 
(2011) object, applying a number of the 1–5 objections. Elgin and 
Sober (2014) reply, mainly defending the claim the P is causal.8
I will argue that of those of 1–5 that are true, none are 
problematic.9,10
6Among other qualifications, we are suppressing, fitness is really relative to an environment. 
See rosenberg and Bouchard (2015) for some of the other complications.
7My formulation is simpler than those of Sober, Elgin, Lange & rosenberg but I think the 
qualifications they add can be left implicit.
8Sober and Elgin give less trivial examples too, but I want to focus on the most problematic 
law, and argue that it is still causal.
9It’s worth mentioning that although the problem is put in terms of functional terms, it is really 
the presence of dispositional terms that generates all the problems. I take it a dispositional 
term is defined in terms of its causes and effects; a functional term is too, but also requires 
a lower-level realizer. So a dispositional term that is not a functional term will refer to a bare 
disposition (McKitrick 2003). The problems look slightly different for bare dispositions. First, 
the overdetermination problem goes away, as there is no realizer to compete with the high-
er-level property. Second, the necessity problem is worse, as bare dispositions are plausibly 
fundamental properties. Humeans claim fundamentals are recombinable. Thus, Humeans 
must deny the existence of bare dispositions.
10For related arguments focused on the philosophy of mind, see Bradley (2013).
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4. Solutions
4.1. The law is a priori
Let’s distinguish between statements that are committed to the 
instantiation of the properties (or existence of the objects) they 
purport to refer to, and those that don’t. Call the former existen-
tially committing. For example, it is natural to interpret the follow-
ing as existentially committing:
(Exist) Token event C causes token event E.
It looks like there needs to be something for C and E to refer to, in 
order for the sentence to be true. By contrast, there is no similar 
commitment when we use the subjunctive and explicitly hedge 
for the instantiation of the properties:
(non-exist) Property q would cause property p, if such properties 
were instantiated.
Non-exist can be true, even if p and q are not instantiated. It would 
be implausible for a priori laws to be existentially committing. 
So we should state Des and Des’ as the following subjunctive 
conditional:
[Des-hedged] The property of desiring p would cause property p, if 
such properties were instantiated.11
I agree that this law is a priori, but not problematically so. We are 
not committed to any mysterious knowledge of the world. We 
know merely from understanding the term ‘desire’ that the law is 
true. P can be understood in the same way, as a subjunctive con-
ditional, hedged for the instantiation of the properties.
Sober (2011) made the required distinctions. He distinguished 
three types of causal claim – ‘e1 caused e2’; ‘e1 actually promoted 
e2’; and ‘e1 would promote e2’ – and only claimed the last was a 
priori, as only the last avoids commitment to the existence of e1 
and e2.
4.2. The law is necessary
The issue here is whether the law violates Hume’s dictum that there 
are no necessary connections between distinct existences. It does 
11This roughly corresponds to a Carnap-sentence; the unhedged sentence roughly corresponds 
to a ramsey-sentence (see Schilpp 1963).
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not. Lewis (1994) was explicit that his functionalism does not con-
flict with Humeanism, explaining the point as follows:
We have no necessary connections between distinct [existences12] 
of course; the necessity is verbal. The state itself could have failed to 
occupy its causal role, but would thereby have failed to deserve its 
mental name …
at some point … weird tales of folk psychology that habitually offend 
against the principles of folk psychology stop making sense; because 
at some point the offending states lose all claim to their folk-psycho-
logical names. 417–418
For example, the property that realizes my desire to stay dry – 
some neural property – could have failed to cause my picking up 
the umbrella (even under the right conditions), but then it would 
not have been a desire to stay dry.
The only necessary connections here are between non-distinct 
existences. There is a necessary connection between the desire 
to stay dry and the picking up of the umbrella; and these are not 
distinct, as the desire is characterized in terms of behaviors such 
as picking up the umbrella. By contrast, the neural state is distinct 
from picking up the umbrella, and there is no necessary connec-
tion between the two. The neural state could have had different 
effects (but then would not have been the desire to stay dry).
Similarly, the property that realizes trait a’s being fitter than trait 
B could have failed to cause an increase in frequency, but then it 
would not have been an instance of relative fitness. The realizing 
state is distinct from the increase in frequency; the fitness is not 
distinct from the increase in frequency. There is a necessary con-
nection only between the latter two.
In both cases, the lower-level laws connecting the realizer with 
the effects are contingent; the higher-level laws connecting the 
functional property with its effects are necessary.
The underlying issue here is that the principle of recombination 
the Humean is committed to – roughly that any combination of 
properties across space and time is possible13 – does not apply 
to all properties. It is only the fundamental properties that can 
be recombined, so we should not expect that properties such as 
12Lewis writes ‘essences’. I’m not sure if this was a slip; but I don’t think this Humean principle 
is best expressed with the vexed notion of essences.
13Armstrong (1997).
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desiring p or being fitter than B are combinable with any and all 
other properties.14,15
4.3. The law is not explanatory
Consider my reaching for an umbrella, and the purported expla-
nation that I desired to stay dry. Is this explanatory? I think so, but 
the details depend on your theory of explanation.
Let’s start with the simple view that an explanation is an argu-
ment to the effect that the phenomenon to be explained was to be 
expected given certain explanatory facts.16 (For now we don’t put 
any further restrictions on what it takes to be an explanation e.g. 
describing the causal history. We’ll add this restriction in the next 
section.) according to this theory, desires can explain. We just need 
the dry-keeping behavior to be expected given the facts about 
beliefs and desires, and we saw above that it will be. Similarly, the 
increase in frequency is to be expected given the facts about fitness.
One might object that even if the criteria for being an expla-
nation are technically satisfied, the resulting explanation is too 
trivial to be satisfactory, and so cannot provide an account of the 
explanatory power of P. The problem is that the explanation effec-
tively says: trait a increased in frequency because it was expected 
to increase in frequency.
One response is to deny that P is as explanatory as it looks.17 
a less concessive response is to point out that we are using toy 
examples involving simple definitions of fitness and desire. using 
more realistic definitions would make explicit the other causal con-
nections that fitness and desire will have. For example, we might 
add that desiring p can be caused by positive past experiences of 
p. and we might require that fitter traits increase in frequency due 
to ecological interactions that produce systematic differences in 
reproductive success. Thus, desire and fitness can both be identi-
fied as nodes in a complex causal network. Laws containing these 
fuller definitions will not look as trivial as P’.
14Thus, Humeans need not be troubled by Bird’s (2001) claim that necessarily, salt dissolves 
in water.
15Lewis 1986a, 88. Of course, there is considerable controversy about which properties are 
distinct, and which can be recombined (see Wilson 2010).
16e.g. van Fraassen (1980).
17See Beatty 1981, Thompson 1989 Brandon 1990 and Lloyd 1994.
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a different objection to the explanatoriness of the law is that 
citing the desire or the fitness leaves out relevant lower-level facts, 
for example, details about the neural structure of the brain, and 
so is not fully explanatory.
In response, it’s true that details are left out of the explanation, 
but no explanation gives every detail. as Sober and Elgin point 
out, ‘all causal statements omit some causal fact or other that is 
explanatorily important’ (168).
The objection might be pressed that an explanation in terms of 
the lower-level properties – perhaps describing the neural struc-
ture – would be better. The explanation in terms of lower-level 
properties includes more details, details that might explain the 
underlying mechanism.
Let’s concede that the lower-level explanation might be better 
sometimes. But other times an explanation in terms of lower-level 
properties is worse, as it mentions irrelevant details. For example, 
the best explanation of why a conductor is annoyed might be that 
someone coughed; to add that Bob coughed is to add irrelevant 
and misleading details.18 Similarly, we normally don’t care about 
the neural structure of other people; we care about their beliefs 
and desires. So an explanation of behavior in terms of neural states 
would contain irrelevant details. Similarly, we might want to know 
whether the change in the frequency of a trait was due to natural 
selection, as opposed to a freak event, or artificial selection. again, 
lower-level details would be irrelevant.
However, some deny the simple theory of explanation we have 
been using. One of the main challenges is from those who add 
that explanations must cite causally relevant properties,19 and that 
higher-level properties are not causally relevant. This introduces 
the concept of causation, which brings us to the next worry.
4.4. The law is not causally explanatory
One might deny that higher-level properties are explanatory on 
the grounds that only the lower-level explanation gives the caus-
ally relevant properties. L&R seem to take this line:
18Compare Putnam (1975), Jackson and Pettit (1990), Sober (1999).
19‘To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history’ (Lewis 1986a, 
217).
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We acknowledge that there are philosophically innocuous a priori 
causal statements … However, it is difficult to see how these a priori 
… statements could figure in causal explanations. 593 (Italics original)
The worry seems to be that the higher-level properties don’t 
cause the effect. Whether they do will depend on your theory of 
causation.
Theories of causation can be usefully divided into two catego-
ries – probability theories and process theories.20 On probability 
theories, causing is making more likely21; on process views, causing 
is physical producing.22 Let’s take each in turn. I will argue that on 
either approach, the law can be causally explanatory.
assuming the probability theory – that causing is making more 
likely – higher-level properties can clearly be causally relevant. For 
example, the umbrella-reaching would have had a lower probabil-
ity in the absence of the desire, so the desire is causally relevant. 
Similarly, if a had not been fitter than B then an increase in a’s 
frequency would have been less probable. again, a’s fitness comes 
out causally relevant.
Process views are less discussed than probability views, but the 
underlying idea is that there is some physical connection between 
cause and effect, such as an energy flow. Can functional proper-
ties generate such a physical connection? I see no reason why 
a functional property can’t generate a physical connection. For 
example, the desire is located in the brain, and energy can flow 
from the brain, to the muscles, and then on to the umbrella as it 
gets picked up.23
Still, one way to develop the process view is to hold that the 
real causal process only happens at the micro-level, and this would 
result in higher-level properties not being causally efficacious. We’ll 
consider this austere metaphysical picture in the next section.
4.5 The law overdetermines
Let’s grant that my neural properties caused the reaching. If my 
desire also caused the reaching, the reaching is overdetermined. 
20Schaffer (2014).
21e.g. Davidson 1970, Hitchcock 2001, Lewis 1986b and 2000, Woodward 2003
22e.g. Dowe 1992 and 2000, Ducasse 1926, Kistler 1998, russell 1948, Salmon 1984 and 1998.
23See McKitrick (2005) for a related defense of the causal relevance of dispositions.
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That seems to be bothering L&R, who argue that sleep cannot be 
caused by the property of having a property that causes sleep:
To argue that the second-order property was causally active threat-
ens to require us to accord causal relevance to C’s instantiating a 
third-order property, and a fourth, and so on. accordingly, we sug-
gest that what it is about C that gives it the power to bring about 
E is its involving the ingestion of a substance with a certain intrinsic, 
non-dispositional, natural property involving opium’s chemical struc-
ture. The properties of C that are causally relevant to E, then, do not 
include C’s involving the ingestion of a substance possessing the sec-
ond-order property of being soporific. 594–595
L&R don’t spell out what’s wrong with second, third, or fourth- order 
properties being causally active. But a natural worry is that with all 
these extra causes, the effect is problematically  overdetermined. a 
paradigm overdetermination case is that of two baseballs hitting 
a window at the same time, in which case the breaking of the win-
dow is overdetermined. The coincidence required in this example 
indicates that this kind of overdetermination must be unusual. So 
it seems that any theory that posits widespread overdetermination 
must be wrong.
a version of this argument has been hugely influential in the 
philosophy of mind. Kim (1973, 1998) has famously used overde-
termination worries to argue that mental higher-level properties 
are not causally efficacious.24
But if we don’t countenance mental higher-level properties 
as causes, it is difficult to stop there. First, the overdetermination 
argument can be extended to any higher-level properties, which 
can be found in many higher-level sciences, not just psychology. 
Every science other than physics will deal in epiphenomenal 
properties.25
Second, the overdetermination argument can be extended 
to objects – the window was broken by both the baseball and 
the molecules in the baseball.26 These extensions of Kim’s argu-
ment push us toward the view that the only objects, and the only 
causes, that exist are those at the lowest level of science i.e. particle 
24Shapiro and Sober (2007) discuss the overdetermination case and argue that mental and 
physical causes don’t constitute overdetermination in the relevant sense.
25See Marras (2000), Bontly (2001) and Block (2003). The move from psychology to other 
sciences might be denied, but an argument would be needed. Although the literature focuses 
on psychology rather than other higher-level sciences, this seems to me a historical accident.
26Merricks (2001).
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physics, or whatever will replace it. On this view, desires, beliefs, 
fitness, organisms and rocks do not exist / are not instantiated. 
I have some sympathy for such an austere metaphysics, but I doubt 
L&R, nor many others, will wish to follow the argument to this 
conclusion.27
a more palatable conclusion is to accept overdetermination. 
Overdetermination seems problematic in typical examples, such as 
where two baseballs break a window. These cases require a coinci-
dence, and it is implausible to believe that such coincidences hap-
pen all the time. But the overdetermination of, say, a higher-level 
property and its realizer are not like this. It is no coincidence that 
both the higher level and intrinsic properties are instantiated in 
the same object – the two properties are intimately connected. 
Spelling out the exact nature of this intimate connection remains 
a vexed issue. But Schaffer (2003) and Sider (2003) have offered 
compelling arguments that overdetermination is everywhere, and 
is unproblematic. If so, there is no problem with the realizer and 
the higher-level property both being causally relevant.
Thus, trait a being fitter than trait B causes the increase in fre-
quency, and so does the lower-level property that realizes trait a 
being fitter than trait B. It is no coincidence that both these prop-
erties are instantiated together, so there is nothing problematic 
about this type of overdetermination.
5. Conclusion
To sum up, I have generalized and defended Sober and Elgin’s 
claim that there are a priori causal laws in evolutionary biology – I 
think there are a priori causal laws in many sciences that posit 
higher-level properties. This view has consequences that might 
seem surprising, and which have not been widely acknowledged 
in the literature. But I have argued that these consequences follow 
from countenancing functional properties. Rather than showing 
what is wrong with functional properties, they lead us to a better 
understanding of what functional properties involve.
27Furthermore, those who accept this austere metaphysics do not have to say that the causal 
claims of the higher-level sciences are false. Instead, they can say that the claims are 
grounded in the fundamental metaphysics, and that therefore utterances of ‘desires cause 
behaviour’ are true.
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Why are these consequences relatively unfamiliar? My hunch is 
that these consequences of functional laws have been overlooked 
because the literature has focused on the question of whether 
there are any functional laws (or higher-level laws).28 Those argu-
ing against have generally tried to show that functional laws 
are to be ruled out in some principled way e.g. as being ceteris 
paribus, or not fundamental. These arguments would, in a sense, 
rule out functional laws on principle, as opposed to the reductio 
strategy of granting that there are functional laws and showing 
they have unacceptable consequences. Only the latter strategy 
would bring out the consequences we have been discussing. On 
the other hand, those defending the existence of functional laws 
have often tried to minimize the difference between functional 
and fundamental laws, in order to show that the former are as wor-
thy of being laws as the latter. But this strategy risks overlooking 
the important differences between them.29
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